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 3 
Introduction 
 
At the early stage of the civil uprising against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, 
in 2011, the activist Rami Jarrah joined the crowd and started filming the protests on the streets 
that soon faced the government’s response: violence, killings, and detentions for those 
involved.1 The Syrian Internet, previously quite slow and unstable, suddenly became faster and 
more reliable after the outbreak, Jarrah told Al Jazeera.2 He said the regime learned the power 
offered by cyberspace as a counter-insurgency tool: he was detained for three days and tortured 
by government forces. The first question in the interrogation concerned his cyber activities: his 
contacts on Facebook were demanded, as well as the IPs from where his account on social 
media had been accessed. The strategy of using cyberspace to chase down activists against the 
regime became a mark of the Syrian war.3  
This essay aims to explain how the Syrian government has used, directly or indirectly, 
cyberspace with the goal of remaining in power. Cyberspace here is understood as a domain 
consisting of the “interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including 
the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers.”4 Assad’s cyber strategy took advantage of hacktivist groups like the Syrian 
Electronic Army (SEA), with which the regime has a convenient, informal connection, to 
perpetrate cyber-attacks against his opponents.5 Although there is no consensus on a definition, 
                                                                
1 Ruhfus, Juliana. “Syria’s Electronic Armies.” Accessed April 11, 2018. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2015/06/syria-electronic-armies-
150617151503360.html. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Baiazy, Amjad. “Syria’s Cyber Wars,” January 6, 2012. 
http://www.academia.edu/3555530/Syria_Cyber_Wars. 
4 JP 1-02, 141, quoted in Schott W. Beidleman, “Defining and Deterring Cyber War” (U.S. Army War College, 
2009), 
http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/DEFINING%20AND%20DETERRING%20cyber%20war.pdf. 
5 Stewart Bertram, “‘Close Enough’ – The Link between the Syrian Electronic Army and the Bashar Al-Assad 
Regime, and Implications for the Future Development of Nation-State Cyber Counter-Insurgency Strategies,” 
Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (February 8, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1294. 
 4 
cyber-attacks here are understood as attempts “to use the internet or advanced computer 
technology to harm the fundamental interests of a political community substantially”.6 
Ultimately, the Syrian regime’s strategy hampered international efforts to support grassroots 
organizations working to build up a stronger civil society. What’s worse, the cyber strategy 
helped asphyxiate Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other activists, preventing them 
from better coordinating opposition efforts.7  
Later, this essay hints upon Assad’s cyber strategy as being supported by and similar to 
his international allies in the conflict. First, Iran is known for having trained cyber activists in 
Syria, although no proof has been collected since the nature of cyber conflict allows for 
protecting perpetrators’ identities and the way they coordinate.8 Second, Syria’s cyber strategy 
resembles Russia’s policy of shaping regional political events by favoring cyber hacktivists 
with whom it has mutual interests, examples of victims being Georgia, Ukraine, and Estonia.9 
The Assad regime emits signals that it has learned from Russia on how to do the same, 
with nefarious implications for future conflicts that spill into the cyber realm. The misuse of 
cyberspace in the current Syrian war can become a blueprint for future conflicts — especially 
authoritarian regimes backed up by cyber powers that may eventually face a democratic 
uprising. 
A legal framework defining cyberwar, cyber-attacks, and cyberspace under 
international law would help counter issues deriving from any sort of cyber-conflict (such as 
enabling international actors to hold states accountable for cyber-attacks, which includes the 
                                                                
6 Orend, B. (2014). Fog in the Fifth Dimension: The Ethics of Cyber-War. In L. Floridi, & M. Taddeo (Eds.), 
The Ethics of Information Warfare (pp. 3-24). New York: Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 
quoted in Deegan, Arthur, Yasir Kalid, Michelle Kingue, and Aldo Taboada. “Cyber-Ia: The Ethical 
Considerations Behind Syria’s Cyber-War | Small Wars Journal,” 2017, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyber-ia-the-ethical-considerations-behind-syria%E2%80%99s-cyber-war. 
7 Ahmed K. Al-Rawi, “Cyber Warriors in the Middle East: The Case of the Syrian Electronic Army,” Public 
Relations Review 40, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 420–28, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.04.005. 
8 Edwin Grohe, “The Cyber Dimensions of the Syrian Civil War: Implications for Future Conflict,” 
Comparative Strategy 34, no. 2 (March 15, 2015): 133–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2015.1017342. 
9 Jeffrey Carr, “The Role of Cyber in Military Doctrine,” in Inside Cyber Warfare (O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2009). 
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current conflict in Syria), but efforts toward that goal seem to be distant.10 However, even if 
that occurs, the granular and convenient relationship between states and cyber hacktivists 
would render the challenges of identifying perpetrators that could respond to their acts almost 
impenetrable.  
In light of such issues, policy recommendations will be given to international 
organizations. They should focus on cyber protection regardless of their field of activity, in 
Syria or elsewhere. The use of cyberspace as a warfare tool can become a trend in future 
conflicts, especially those where societies stand against authoritarian regimes. 
 
 
 
 
The Syrian cyber strategy and its victims 
 
The Internet and social media were largely used as a platform for activists in Tunisia 
and Egypt to organize protests against their governments.11 Both countries shut down the 
Internet to contain such oppositions, but that did not impede both uprisings from overthrowing 
the respective regimes.12 In Syria, the opposite happened. Facebook, prohibited in the country 
until shortly before the revolution, remained opened.13 The Syrian move was soon understood 
by activists as a part of a broader political objective — by allowing activists to keep accessing 
the Internet, the regime could use cyberspace as a way of cracking down on opponents, as 
previously mentioned. Internet in Syria was already under surveillance by the regime when the 
                                                                
10 Beidleman, Schott W. “Defining and Deterring Cyber War.” U.S. Army War College, 2009. 
http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/DEFINING%20AND%20DETERRING%20cyber%20war.pdf. 
11 Shehabat, Ahmad. “The Social Media Cyber-War: The Unfolding Events in the Syrian Revolution 201,” n.d., 
9. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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uprising broke out, through filtering techniques to block users from accessing content related 
to politics, security, or social issues.14 The country has twelve Internet providers, controlled by 
the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE), a state-owned company, according to a 
study.15 It became easy for the government to use the Internet for its own purposes, with the 
deployment of a system to control and monitor communications between activities through 
exchanged messages.16 
A great part of this strategy was conducted not directly by the government, but by a 
third-party to the conflict, the pro-regime hacktivist group SEA. Four other main groups joined 
the pro-government efforts against the opposition since then, but what distinguishes the SEA 
from the others is the level of sophistication adopted in their acts: from 2011 and 2015, 
hundreds of distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), malware, and spear phishing emails 
were systematically used to crack down on anyone against the Syrian government.17 The 
group’s most notable international attack was the defacement of the Associated Press Twitter 
account, in which a tweet stated that bombs at the White House had injured then-president 
Barack Obama, leaving the Dow Jones with a loss of USD 136 billion in minutes.18 The 
American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has added two hackers from the group to its 
list of most wanted, for having provided “support to the Assad regime” and, therefore, for 
damaging the American “national security”.19  
Because of their pro-government efforts on cyberspace, suspicion was raised that the 
SEA was connected to Assad, especially when the latter thanked the role of cyber counter-
                                                                
14 Deibert, Ronald J. “The Geopolitics of Internet Control Censorship, Sovereignty, and Cyberspace,” n.d. 
http://www.handbook-of-internet-politics.com/pdfs/chapter_23.pdf. 
15 Patrice Robin and Marie Baezner, “The Use of Cybertools in an Internationalized Civil War Context: Cyber 
Activities in the Syrian Conflict” (ETH Zurich, 2017), https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000200662. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Gross, Michael Joseph. “Silent War.” Vanity Fair, 2013. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2013/07/new-
cyberwar-victims-american-business. 
19 “Two From ‘Syrian Electronic Army’ Added to Cyber’s Most Wanted,” Story, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, accessed April 12, 2018, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/two-from-syrian-electronic-army-
added-to-cybers-most-wanted. 
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revolutionaries publicly.20 The relationship between the group and the government is still 
dubious. A study in which the author interviewed members of the group found that Damascus 
had given money to SEA hacktivists.21 In another study, Bertram analyzed data related to the 
SEA’s activities and found that the SEA was conveniently close to the government.22 According 
to him, the SEA was distant from Assad to the point that the latter could avoid responsibility 
of cyber-attacks coming from the group; but it was close enough that the regime enjoyed the 
benefits of having a cyber army fighting for its political stability. The advantage from the nature 
of this relationship comes from the almost impossibility to identify the perpetrators of 
cyberattacks.23 
The government simply turned a blind eye to the SEA’s activities while it persecuted 
opponents in cyberspace.24 The SEA’s websites were hosted under the Syrian Computer 
Society — a pro-Assad branch, which provides, among others, access to the Internet to the 
SEA.25 Bertram raised the fact that the regime could block contents on YouTube and Facebook, 
but SEA’s content remained untouched, which leaves the suspicion that the regime was aware 
of the group’s activities but did nothing to block them. The regime’s silence, says Bertram, 
“speaks volumes” in this case.  
The author also analyzed emails leaked by the WikiLeaks under the Syria files in 2012, 
and found that members of the SEA were directly connected to key governmental media 
                                                                
20 Ruhfus, Juliana. “Syria’s Electronic Armies.” Accessed April 11, 2018. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2015/06/syria-electronic-armies-
150617151503360.html. 
21 Amjad Baiazy, “Syria’s Cyber Wars,” January 6, 2012, 
http://www.academia.edu/3555530/Syria_Cyber_Wars. 
22 Stewart Bertram, “‘Close Enough’ – The Link between the Syrian Electronic Army and the Bashar Al-Assad 
Regime, and Implications for the Future Development of Nation-State Cyber Counter-Insurgency Strategies,” 
Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (February 8, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1294. 
23 Schott W. Beidleman, “Defining and Deterring Cyber War” (U.S. Army War College, 2009), 
http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/DEFINING%20AND%20DETERRING%20cyber%20war.pdf. 
24 Stewart Bertram, “‘Close Enough’ – The Link between the Syrian Electronic Army and the Bashar Al-Assad 
Regime, and Implications for the Future Development of Nation-State Cyber Counter-Insurgency Strategies,” 
Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (February 8, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1294. 
25 Ibid. 
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interlocutors, three degrees below the regime’s chief in hierarchy.  The e-mails also revealed 
Assad’s awareness of the importance of public outreach via social media and intervening in 
public online discussions—actions similar to those taken by the SEA.26 Despite the 
impossibility to affirm whether this relationship is deliberate, the SEA has given Assad benefits 
— a supporter in cyberspace, and the possibility that this support promotes illegal activities 
that the state itself wouldn’t be able to do openly. 
The Syrian cyber strategy has effectively hampered civil society organizations’ ability 
to coordinate with each other. Dayoub, an interviewee from a Syrian grassroots organization 
operating in Istanbul, said that at the beginning of the revolution the task of coordinating and 
mapping potential allies via the Internet was almost impossible: it took him more than three 
years to learn how to codify messages and use alternative Internet providers for those 
purposes.27 “We finally professionalized the way of communicating on Facebook”, Dayoub 
said about those strategies that happened to be studied by other authors.28  Cyber-surveillance 
was one among other relevant reasons why activists moved to Turkey in 2015 — four years 
after the uprising, enough time for the government to establish a strong anti-opposition 
campaign with the help of cyber warfare.  
That lagged the process of mapping allies doing similar jobs in Syria and of establishing 
networks with international organizations as well. The controlled cyberspace and the 
impossibility to coordinate on the ground with people living in regime-controlled areas in Syria 
made many organizations fail to know what other grassroots groups were doing, Dayoub said. 
Activists could only safely operate — both in the physical and in the digital realms — in 
opposition-held areas; as long as the regime regained access to those areas, activists had to 
                                                                
26 Edwin Grohe, “The Cyber Dimensions of the Syrian Civil War: Implications for Future Conflict,” 
Comparative Strategy 34, no. 2 (March 15, 2015): 133–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2015.1017342. 
27 Interview with Dayoub, a Syrian activist working on civil society building, 13 February 2018. 
28 Faris, Rob, Hal Roberts, Rebekah Heacock, Ethan Zuckerman, and Urs Gasser. “Online Security in the 
Middle East and North Africa: A Survey of Perceptions, Knowledge and Practice,” n.d., 18. 
28 Interview with Dabbagh, a Syrian working with a think tank in Syria, 14 February 2018. 
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evacuate and terminate their operations, said another interviewee working with an international 
organization in Syria.29  These accounts help show how the Syrian government used cyberspace 
to support its military strategies on the ground. The asphyxia imposed on activists and 
international organizations through cyberspace, with the support of SEA, gave the regime a 
strategic advantage in the civil war. 
 
 
 
Iran’s and Russia’s influence on the Syrian strategy 
 
The effectiveness of the Syrian cyber strategy against opponents has been partly 
attributed to neighboring allies, like Russia and Iran.30 Since the outbreak of the conflict, Iran 
has helped pro-Assad groups and militias not only with equipment but also with training, and 
money.31 As the SEA’s strategy in cyberspace became more sophisticated over time, evidence 
suggested that the hacktivists in Syria have also been assisted by Iran, through the latter’s Cyber 
Army.32 As the documentary Zero Days showed, Iran has built its cyber capabilities in response 
to Stuxnet.33 With powerful interviews and secret sources from the National Security Agency 
in the US, the movie shows how Stuxnet, a powerful computer worm, was developed in a joint 
and covert operation between the American and Israeli intelligence agencies with the intent of 
physically destroying Iran's nuclear centrifuges in 2008, lagging the country’s nuclear plans 
and helping Western countries buy time to impose sanctions on Iran. It was the first time a virus 
                                                                
 
30 Robin, Patrice, and Marie Baezner. “The Use of Cybertools in an Internationalized Civil War Context: Cyber 
Activities in the Syrian Conflict.” ETH Zurich, 2017. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000200662. 
31 Bryan Lee, “The Impact of Cyber Capabilities in the Syrian Civil War | Small Wars Journal,” accessed April 
11, 2018, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-impact-of-cyber-capabilities-in-the-syrian-civil-war. 
32 Gross, Michael Joseph. “Silent War.” Vanity Fair, 2013. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2013/07/new-
cyberwar-victims-american-business. 
33 Gibney, Alex. Zero Days. Documentary. Magnolia Pictures, 2016. 
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had such an impact.  
The strategy failed to block Iran from advancing its nuclear capabilities and only 
offered a small strategic advance, as Zero Days has shown. Worse than that, Iran, apparently 
in revenge for Stuxnet, built up a cyber army, financed with $20 million, that today is known 
for being the fourth largest in the world.34 The lessons depicted in the movie are startling. By 
having helped deploy Stuxnet against Iran, the US has indirectly helped create a cyber power 
that allegedly backs up the Syrian regime.  
The Syrian cyber strategy is also remarkably similar to the one Russia has developed 
over the past decades. In 2007, when the Estonian authorities decided to move a statue that 
served as a memorial to the Soviet Red Army, the act was responded to by a massive cyber-
attack that paralyzed the country’s banking system and governmental bodies.35 After the 
attacks, which lasted for weeks,  few doubted that the Russian authorities weren’t involved, 
since instructions to attack the Estonian government were made available in Russian and came 
from Russian IP addresses.36 The similarity to the Syrian case is that no proof could be found 
directly associating Moscow with the cyber intrusion.37 In 2008, Georgia would fall victim to 
a similarly orchestrated and organized cyber-attack that took place almost at the same time that 
Russia invaded the country, and Ukraine was also a victim of such cyber-attacks.38 These cases 
are examples of how Russia uses cyber-attacks to shape political events; it avoids attributability 
by not acting to hold pro-government hacktivist groups accountable — or maybe even covertly 
supports them with resources.39  
                                                                
34 Insider, Paul Szoldra, Business. “Iran Now Has One of the Largest Armies of Hackers in the World — and 
the US Is Partly to Blame.” Business Insider. Accessed April 13, 2018. http://www.businessinsider.com/us-
hacker-army-stuxnet-2016-7. 
35 McGuinness, Damien. “How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia.” BBC News, April 27, 2017, sec. Europe. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/39655415. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Wirtz, James J. “Cyber War and Strategic Culture: The Russian Integration of Cyber Power into Grand 
Strategy,” n.d., 11. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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Russia’s cyber strategy teaches that states can take advantage of proxy, non-state actors, 
overtly or covertly, to perform attacks in cyberspace that would otherwise be deniable.40 They 
are already a reality because conflicts taking advantage of cyberspace are taking place with 
Russia’s support. Availing themselves of the same kind of covert operations used under 
Stuxnet, Western opponents operating in Syria's orbit have been enjoying the fact that forces 
like NATO cannot do anything to respond to cyber-attacks because no one can say for sure they 
are behind them.41 Such attacks originating in the East not only shape political landscapes in 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East, but could be ultimately directed at the West in case the 
US — or even Israel — take the risk of deploying another cyber weapon like Stuxnet or even 
in case they deepen their kinetic participation in the Syrian war.42 The SEA in Syria has no 
such resources to attack Western infrastructures like Stuxnet did, but Russia and Iran could — 
and both are on the Syrian side.43 
Jame’s and Rohozinski’s predicted that cyber weapons would object the goal of 
constraining adversaries’ capacity to coordinate, maneuver, or synchronize and from shifting 
adversaries’ focus in a war in the context of international cyber conflicts.44 But reality shows 
that the masters of cyber weapons today can not only aim their codes at international bodies, 
but can transfer their know-how to authoritarian regimes — and the latter can turn them against 
their own people. 
 
                                                                
40 Klimburg, Alexander. “Mobilising Cyber Power.” Survival 53, no. 1 (February 2011): 41–60. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.555595; and Andrew, James. “‘Compelling Opponents to Our Will’: 
The Role of Cyber Warfare in Ukraine,” n.d., 11. 
41 Edwin Grohe, “The Cyber Dimensions of the Syrian Civil War: Implications for Future Conflict,” 
Comparative Strategy 34, no. 2 (March 15, 2015): 133–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2015.1017342. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Edwin Grohe, “The Cyber Dimensions of the Syrian Civil War: Implications for Future Conflict,” 
Comparative Strategy 34, no. 2 (March 15, 2015): 133–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2015.1017342. 
44 Farwell, James P., and Rafal Rohozinski. “The New Reality of Cyber War.” Survival 54, no. 4 (September 
2012): 107–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2012.709391. 
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Policy recommendations 
 
Overcoming the implications of cyberattacks at the international level is challenging, 
as the documentary Zero Days has explored. There is no legal framework defining it 
internationally as previously noted. Although efforts must be taken to overcome this legal 
vacuum, so countries can be held accountable for attacks committed through cyberspace, any 
solid framework remains far from being designed and adopted by the international 
community.45  As discussed before, the fact that states are using non-state actors to perpetrate 
cyberattacks against their external and internal enemies would render legal frameworks 
worthless even if they already existed. Proposing definitive solutions at the international level 
could be naïve. It would be more feasible if international non-state actors — such as donors, 
think tanks, or humanitarian organizations—, surveyed the digital environment in which they 
are operating to render collaboration, democratization, and humanitarian efforts between them 
and grassroots organizations to be more efficient and effective.  
Therefore, policy recommendations will focus on those actors. A survey conducted in 
Syria and other countries in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring showed that few 
activists knew how to protect themselves in the digital realm, in a moment where a high number 
of respondents were facing cyber-attacks, threats, arrests, and detentions because of their online 
activism.46 Policies involving technological responses in a cyber conflict cannot be rendered 
as a “one-size-fit-all” model, since states like Syria can shift, tweak, and adapt their digital 
tools to overcome activists’ security measures.47 But some feasible (and non-exhaustive list of) 
policy ideas for Syria and future cyber conflicts could help and are numbered below: 
                                                                
45 Deegan, Arthur, Yasir Kalid, Michelle Kingue, and Aldo Taboada. “Cyber-Ia: The Ethical Considerations 
Behind Syria’s Cyber-War | Small Wars Journal,” 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyber-ia-the-
ethical-considerations-behind-syria%E2%80%99s-cyber-war. 
46 Faris, Rob, Hal Roberts, Rebekah Heacock, Ethan Zuckerman, and Urs Gasser. “Online Security in the 
Middle East and North Africa: A Survey of Perceptions, Knowledge and Practice,” n.d., 18. 
47 Hal Roberts et al., “The Evolving Landscape of Internet Control,” n.d., 12. 
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1) Offering security protection techniques, combined with the tutoring of a team of 
digital experts could improve the cyberspace landscape in places like Syria. They should be 
part of the scope of policies that international organizations deploy in war zones regardless of 
their field of work: be they involved in humanitarian work or in empowering civil society. This 
is particularly relevant in civil wars that have their cyberspaces under surveillance and that are 
used as a tool for warfare like Syria’s. Rendering the digital-scape a safer environment allows 
civil society to better collaborate and coordinate against states' cyber reactions to cyber 
insurgencies. 
2) International organizations can learn from the Syrian experience of working with 
diaspora communities and help local organizations build their own protected channels of 
communications with the outside world. The availability of a team of digital experts is key to 
assisting local grassroots groups on how to do that. They can help set a protected channel of 
communication where locals can coordinate support with other relevant actors — activists or 
international organizations — through the support of diasporas living outside the country. That 
can help avoid the risks arising from Internet control and improve coordination. The exercise 
of mapping diaspora communities outside war zones is a necessary step to make this policy 
more effective. 
3) International organizations should permanently monitor cyberspace when working 
in conflict zones like Syria. Technical experts can help trace DDoS attacks and techniques 
deployed by hacktivists48 — whether they work directly with governments or not, like the SEA 
in Syria — and therefore be more prepared to adjust digital responses to such attacks. 
4) As part of the previous digital strategy, international organizations may work more 
closely with think thanks, NGOs, or companies working on Internet-related issues, like the 
OpenNet Initiative.49 This would likely improve advocacy efforts for both international 
                                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 “About ONI | OpenNet Initiative.” Accessed April 15, 2018. https://opennet.net/about-oni. 
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organizations and the local grassroots groups with whom the former ones establish 
partnerships, through a policy of name and shame, while building up a solid documentation of 
attacks deployed and used in cyberspace by relevant parties to the conflict. By releasing that 
type of information, other networks may be aware of other organizations working on similar 
issues — and they will also learn how to overcome digital barriers or how to respond to attacks 
deployed against them. 
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